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ABSTRACT 
 
The digital transformation, characteristic of recent decades, now pervades many 
aspects of everyday life, and MOOCs are an illustrative example of this process. 
Massive Open Online Courses are university-level courses on a specific subject 
delivered online via digital platforms, and the vast majority of them are free-of-charge. 
Initially launched with an open and collaborative intent as part of the Open Educational 
Resources movement, they soon turned into commercial products. MOOCs enjoyed 
wide coverage by the media, which were particularly enthusiastic about their potential 
as a cost-effective form of education reducing social inequalities in access to 
education. Likewise, skeptical views raised a series of concerns about the risk of 
creating new inequalities, further reinforcing existing ones, and eventually favoring the 
few to the detriment of the open and collaborative original intent. By presenting three 
cases of resistance to the adoption of MOOCs for academic credits that occurred at 
three (very) different universities in the United States, the paper sheds light on the 
tensions and threats generated by such digital transformations in education. The paper 
investigates the extent to which the introduction of such a type of digital transformation 
challenges the existing distribution of power among actors in the HE system; ultimately, 
whether this innovation further increases inequality among social groups, threatening 
the autonomy and quality of faculty labor. The three cases confirm the emergence of 
tensions i) between faculty and academic leadership in charge of the governance of 
HE institutions at both local and national level; ii) between the neoliberal approach of 
MOOCs advocates and claims of autonomy from the academic staff. At the same time, 
the paper highlights the success of resistance movements that may have contributed 
to growing disenchantment and changes in the business model of MOOCs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The digital transformation characteristic of recent decades now pervades many 
aspects of everyday life, and education is no exception. The availability of educational 
resources put online by university professors since 2011, with no explicit barriers other 
than an internet connection, is a clear example of the extent to which digital 
transformation has entered the arena of education as well.  
MOOCS is the acronym for Massive Open Online Courses, which are university-level 
courses on a specific subject, delivered online via digital platforms (the most popular 
ones are edX, Coursera, FutureLearn, but many others are available, with a great 
variance of business models), and the vast majority of them are free-of-charge (at least 
at basic level (Class Central 2018b).  
Although not directly linked,  the outburst of MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) 
shows important similarities with the phenomenon of the sharing economy 
(Arcidiacono, Gandini, and Pais 2018). Indeed, the origin and success of MOOCs is 
based on openness, collaborative learning and teaching, and accessibility as MOOCs 
are an instance of the Open Education Resources movement (Carfagna 2018). 
Moreover, as happened with many sharing economy experiences, MOOCs enjoyed 
great media coverage: a narrative of disruptive innovation, secular evangelism and 
Silicon Valley tech-positivism characterized their hype (Elisabeth Losh 2017b; Head 
2017). Likewise, the digital transformation in education raises a series of concerns 
about the risk of creating new inequalities, further reinforcing existing ones, and 
eventually favoring the few (Literat 2015; Rhoads, Berdan, and Toven‐Lindsey 2013; 
Rhoads et al. 2015) to the detriment of the open and collaborative original intent (Schor 
et al. 2016).  
The case of MOOCs is particularly illustrative in this regard. The high and growing 
figures associated with MOOCs mean that they have become a ‘common event’ in the 
educational pathways of many different people (81 million learners all over the word 
registered on the 9,400 courses available from several MOOCs platforms (Class 
Central 2018a)). This widespread coverage makes MOOCs a socially significant 
phenomenon that warrants closer attention paid to its social implications, not only to 
the pedagogical aspects associated with the learning experience. Because they are 
used by millions of people every day and everywhere, MOOCs raise important ethical 
issues in terms of quality of education, consequences on faculty labor and business 
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models adopted by providers. Such important themes, however, have to date received 
little attention in the sociological literature.   
Enthusiastic views (in particular among policy makers and academic administrators), 
welcomed these resources as a flexible, customized, and cost-effective form of 
education, opening up a series of opportunities to reduce social inequalities in access 
to education and furnish a solution to the trend of reducing public support for education. 
Skeptical views have questioned the real equalizing and empowering potential of 
MOOCs and pointed to several social implications at micro level (e.g. different quality 
levels of education available to different social groups (Rhoads, Berdan, and Toven‐
Lindsey 2013) as well as at macro level (e.g. consequences on the institutional 
configuration of HE systems (Rhoads et al. 2015) or MOOCs as a form of academic 
neocolonialism (Altbach 2013). 
However, while a growing body of literature considers the pedagogical and psycho-
social aspects of MOOCs, the least investigated aspect of MOOCs is their impact on 
existing actors in the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) of higher 
education (hereafter HE). 
This study addresses a particular period of the hype of MOOCs, between 2012 and 
2013, which highlights the threat posed to the autonomy and quality of faculty labor by 
the neoliberal approach to MOOCs (Carfagna 2018). The risks of deskilling faculty 
labor and loss of intellectual property rights on course materials are critical and still 
current issues (Mark Lieberman 2018; Greg Toppo 2018). 
By presenting three cases of resistance to the adoption of MOOCs for academic credits 
that occurred at three (very) different universities in the United States, the paper sheds 
light on the tensions and threats in terms of innovation and (in)equality generated by 
this example of digital transformation in education. The paper’s main research 
questions are these: whether and how the introduction of this type of digital 
transformation generates (new) tensions at the macro level in the HE system; to what 
extent it challenges the existing distribution of power among actors in the 
organizational field; whether this innovation exacerbates inequality among social 
groups. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The spread of MOOCs 
 
The MOOC phenomenon was characterized by incredible media hype. But in less than 
ten years MOOCs changed from being the tsunami which would revolutionize higher 
education (Auletta 2012) and sweep away the majority of higher education institutions 
to being declared extinct, with scholars talking about their ‘afterlives’ (Elisabeth Losh 
2017b) and a ‘post-MOOC’ age (Bennett and Kent 2017). What happened in such a 
short time? 
This form of open and distance education was already circulating in 2008. The earliest 
versions of MOOCs were introduced by George Siemens and Stephen Downes at the 
University of Manitoba in Fall 2008. The course was called ‘Connectivism and 
Connective Knowledge (CCK08)’ (Siemens 2013). It was based on a connectivist 
pedagogical model centered on a collaborative and generative approach to knowledge 
and emphasized learner autonomy. This version of MOOCs, which has been classified 
by Siemens as cMOOCs, is loosely structured. It stresses the importance of sharing 
personal knowledge among learners, has course facilitators only, and gives the option 
to learners to choose the technology they prefer to use (Siemens 2013). In the following 
years, less interactive versions of MOOCs, which resembled the traditional university 
setting, started to appear in the form of xMOOC. This format was launched in Fall 2011 
with the courses in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning designed respectively 
by Stanford University professors Sebastian Thrun, Daphne Koller and Andrew Ng, 
and was rapidly adopted by other elite US universities like MIT and Harvard. The format 
became the protagonist of MOOC hype in 2012, which made it the worldwide 
recognized format and set the standards for most of the current MOOCs. The 
pedagogical model underlying xMOOCs is the one of ‘teacher as expert’ or knowledge 
duplication opposed to knowledge generation as in the context of cMOOCs (Major and 
Blackmon 2016). xMOOCs are characterized by directed learning by an instructor, a 
structured organization based on weekly course topics, regular assignments which are 
computer-graded, and interaction in online discussion forums (Siemens 2013).  
Whilst in 2011 MOOC still took the form of experiments conducted by a few 
pedagogical innovators, and it was estimated that worldwide they amounted to 10 
(Kent and Bennett 2017), in the next year MOOC became a buzzword: 2012 was 
named “The year of the MOOCs” after the famous New York Times article (Pappano 
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2012). Thereafter, MOOCs gained a considerable number of newspapers headlines 
(fig.1) and were massively present in the public discourse (for example, by the end of 
2013 five of the popular TED Talks hosted MOOCs’ founders or CEOs, and MOOCs 
now had a dedicated playlist (TED 2018)).  
This expansion was accompanied by a particular narrative in public discourse, a sort 
of ‘secular evangelism’ (Elisabeth Losh 2017b) and a rhetoric of disruptive innovation 
as being virtuous in itself (Head 2017). Many readers may remember the powerful 
image of the tsunami propounded by President John Hennessy of Stanford University 
(Auletta 2012) or Sebastian Thrun’s prophecy of only ten higher education institutions 
surviving the revolution (Leckart 2012). This rhetoric also included altruistic claims and 
a positive belief in the democratizing power of MOOCs in accessing education and 
empowering people all around the world through education. Another key feature of the 
media hype was a sense of urgency and a deep trust in technology and the efficiency 
of engineering solutions to be applied in all domains, including social problems. Indeed, 
as some scholars pointed out, the MOOC oratory and rhetoric that characterized the 
public discourse during its hype was characterized by features of secular evangelism 
and digital universalism (Elisabeth Losh 2017b). The former refers to the missionary 
spirit of many statements about MOOCs, associated with philanthropic and charitable 
goals (e.g. helping people in remote rural Africa, young girls in Afghanistan, single 
mothers with ill children, etc.). However, such rhetoric built upon cultural stereotypes, 
US-exceptionalism and “confidence that those with problems do not need to be 
consulted about their choices among possible solutions” (Losh 2017a, p.216). The 
latter expression, ‘digital universalism’, refers to the belief that computational media 
technologies can solve all types of problems, including social ones. Not surprisingly, 
this belief that information technology can rescue people from problems of every kind 
accompanies MOOCs discourse, and it is a key feature of technology companies and, 
in general, of Silicon Valley culture, from which MOOCs originated (Elisabeth Losh 
2017a; Tufekei 2018):  
 
“Digital universalism – or the belief that anyone can be rescued by 
computational media technologies - could also be said to be a feature of the 
rhetoric of many technology companies and of Silicon Valley culture from which 
many MOOCs developed.” (Elisabeth Losh 2017a, 218) 
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The hype reached its pinnacle in 2013; thereafter it started on a downward curve (Kent 
and Bennett 2017). The promises and viability of MOOCs started to be questioned, 
some of the key actors began to acknowledge the limitations of MOOCs (e.g. S. Thrun 
admitting the poor results and ‘lousy product’ of an experimentation in MOOCs at SJSU 
(Chafkin 2013)) and the tone of newspaper articles became less enthusiastic. 
Nonetheless, the number of MOOCs continued to rise: by the end of 2013 the total 
number of students skyrocketed to 10 million, and 1200 courses were available (Class 
Central 2013).  
In that year in particular, the pressure to integrate MOOCs into formal higher education 
reached a critical point. 
Better understanding of the dynamics behind the spread of MOOCs in the USA can be 
gained by considering that the general context of higher education in the USA was 
facing several challenges. In the past fifty years the key term for most national higher 
educational systems had been ‘expansion’, in particular expanding access to socio-
economic groups previously underrepresented (Schofer and Meyer 2005; Meyer et al. 
1997). The centrality of knowledge and skilled labor for the competitiveness of modern 
economies and societies that characterized the advent of the ‘knowledge society’ in 
past decades further increased the demand for higher education (Stevens 2015; Arum 
and Roksa 2011). Until recently, the so-called ‘fourth industrial revolution’, with its 
stress on the centrality of technical specialization and the reskilling of workers in 
technological fields, has contributed to keeping high and even increasing the demand 
for higher education in the USA. 
At the same time, this pressure has been further exacerbated by the increasing costs 
of college education. After 1971 the cost of college education more than doubled, and 
it has increased dramatically in the past ten years, even at public and lower-tier 
institutions (The College Board 2018) (Fig.2). This issue is associated with the problem 
of students’ debt, which is also increasing to a dramatic extent (Fig.3). It is a serious 
threat to the sustainability of the system and creates generations of college graduates 
who enter the labor market with huge debts influencing their future transitions (NAR 
and ASA 2018; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2013; Avery and Turner 2012).  
Against this background, the analogy with the sharing economy and its underlying 
philosophy of digital universalism proves useful in explaining the factors that led to the 
spread of MOOCs. As happened in the sharing economy, the belief that technology 
could solve major social and economic problems while at the same time generating 
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revenues, also applied to higher education. In this perspective, technology and its 
advancement would contribute to a perfect market arrangement in which all actors 
were in a win-win situation.  
For example, this is what has happened in the case of the local transportation sector 
(e.g. Uber): thanks to the high development of information and communication 
technology, it is now possible to address a market inefficiency in the local 
transportation sector i.e. the monopoly of taxis. The existence of a highly regulated 
cartel with barriers to entry reduces competition, keeps prices high, and does not 
incentivize quality outcomes. Introducing a technological innovation that radically 
changes barriers to entry and creates the conditions for more competition would 
(theoretically) improve the pay-offs of all players in a win-win game. The original 
intention was that platform-based ride services should increase the extent of potential 
users in terms of both passengers and drivers. They would benefit the former with 
affordable prices and more rides available; and the latter with income opportunities and 
flexibility of work.  Actually, as we know, things have gone less smoothly than planned, 
because technology also brings about a radical re-organization of labor.  
The case of MOOCs proposed for credits in academia shares some important features 
with the foregoing example. The premise of this analogy is the acknowledgment of a 
social problem: higher education faces severe and longstanding challenges which 
prevent the full use of the potential of young people (and adult workers) to reach a high 
level of qualification which would ultimately contribute to the prosperity of the 
production system and to the wealth and sustainability promised by the fourth industrial 
revolution. This problem can now be addressed with a technological solution made 
available by advances in information and communication technology: online education. 
In this (naïve) perspective, all the parties involved can increase their payoffs: people 
who could not afford higher education (because of cost or time constraints) can now 
take online courses from prestigious universities at no cost - or very low cost compared 
to any face-to-face option. Elite universities re-establish their dominant position in the 
domain of knowledge and brand themselves as helping to democratize access to 
higher education. Finally, education technology companies can earn profits by serving 
a market niche of unsatisfied demand.  
The key difference in this analogy lies in the outcome: unlike several sharing economy 
cases, where technology and digital universalism caught everybody by surprise - in 
particular the groups with a stake in the field - in the case of higher education such 
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approach encountered a great deal of resistance. Indeed, technological innovation 
meant a radical reorganization of labor, for example in the local transportation sector 
(e.g. Uber) and in the hospitality sector (e.g. Airbnb), without meeting any particularly 
significant and effective resistance, at least in the USA. By contrast, the fate of digital 
universalism in the higher education sector went differently for several reasons. One 
reason concerns the particular nature of the higher education sector, which has 
barriers to entry difficult to overcome: transportation and hospitality workers do not 
have the same status within their industries as university professors do. Indeed, not 
everybody can be a university lecturer, because the training and accreditation process 
moves through numerous formal recognized steps and examinations. Another key 
difference with other sharing economy experiences is that in this case those who had 
to bear the highest consequences of the labor reorganization brought about by the 
introduction of technology were able to mobilize themselves as a homogenous group, 
and to achieve a successful outcome. They were also able to mobilize themselves 
because the promoters of such technological innovation in education needed university 
academic staff to be part of the process of implementation. Unlike in the transportation 
and hospitality industries, where cab drivers or hotel workers could be substituted by 
regular citizens with a driving license and a car, an apartment or a spare room, the 
provision of teaching is subject to a series of regulations. And in this respect national 
regulations on accreditation of teachers as well as local rules of institutional 
governance, e.g. the authority of faculty representative bodies over undergraduate 
curricula, worked in favor of a successful mobilization. Indeed, spring 2013 was 
characterized by an active protest movement involving several, very diverse higher 
education institutions, which opposed the introduction of MOOCs as substitutes for 
their regular courses. In that period the threat of MOOCs as an alternative to formal 
higher education institutions predicted by Sebastian Thrun started to take shape, right 
at the pinnacle of the hype. Eventually, MOOC as a substitute for formal higher 
education never really came about; the apocalyptic declarations about the end of 
traditional higher education were not fulfilled, and the number of higher education 
institutions, at least in the USA, is still quite stable. But this particular episode is 
illustrative of the tensions within organizations created by digital transformations. In the 
cases considered here, MOOC caused conflict between faculty and administrators and 
resulted in a process of mobilization which involved institutions of different nature and 
prestige (public and private; elite and non-elite; research and teaching oriented). 
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The US higher education system  
 
HE institutions are a core component of the organizational field of MOOCs for several 
reasons. MOOCs were first introduced by university professors. They continue to be 
designed and taught by academic staff belonging to HE institutions, and they are 
released under the brand of such HE institutions. Second, since their inception and 
then during the hype, MOOCs were presented and promoted as complements to - if 
not substitutes for - higher education, questioning the survival of the current HE setting 
in the medium-long run. Thus, at the same time HE institutions are bearers and victims 
of the threat. This ambivalent role of MOOCs is due to the particular nature of the US 
HE system, which is highly stratified and diversified (van Vught 2009; Meek et al. 
1996).  
Indeed, the MOOC phenomenon originated from a very restricted group of highly 
selective elite universities, which spilled over its consequences on the lower tiers of 
the HE system in a top-down approach.  
As noted by (Labaree 2017, 9), the American HE system is a multi-tier system which 
originated in response to consumer demand expressed in a very competitive market. 
The development of the stratified HE system has been the result of a tension between 
social accessibility and social exclusion which resembles the tension in American 
society between “democratic politics, with its willingness to constrain liberty in order to 
maximize social equality, and liberal markets, with its willingness to tolerate inequality 
in order to maximize liberty” (Labaree 2017, 5). Stratification has thus engendered a 
pyramid of institutions that permits exclusiveness at the top to coexist with 
inclusiveness at the bottom.  
As a result, several types of institution make up the US HE system, of which four-year 
selective elite liberal arts colleges and research universities constitute the top tier. 
Despite attracting most scholarly attention, being considered a key benchmark for 
higher education worldwide, these institutions involve only a tiny minority of the overall 
US student population (they represent 15% of HE programs and educate less than 
10% of all college students) (Scott and Kirst 2017). The vast majority of college 
students in the USA are accommodated by broad access schools. These are HE 
organizational forms that admit the majority of applicants to them and range from 4- to 
2-year programs at public or private organizations. Although multiple ways to classify 
them have been recently developed (Ruef and Nag 2015), the scheme propounded in 
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the 1970s by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and Learning 
remains a commonly shared and used classification for US HE institutions. Drawing 
on the studies by Scott (2015) and Scott, Holzman, et al. (2017), the main types of HE 
institutions can be classified thus: 
 
1. Baccalaureate colleges  
2. Comprehensive colleges 
3. Research universities 
4. Community colleges 
5. Special focus institutions 
6. For-profit entities  
 
This hierarchical and diversified system allowed including a variety of students with different 
backgrounds but also different ambitions and goals. A large part of the literature recognizes 
that the system tends to perpetuate the intergenerational transmission of inequality in 
access to higher education (Roksa et al. 2007). Despite affirmative actions, students from 
minority groups and from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds tend to be 
underrepresented at institutions at the top of the hierarchy (Roksa et al. 2007), and selection 
at elite universities is not fully based on merit (Stevens 2009; Stevens, Armstrong, and Arum 
2008; Jaschik 2018; Hartocollis 2019). Another part of the literature also acknowledges the 
crucial role that such a diversified system can play in the broader context of national and 
regional economic development. Indeed, such a system makes it possible to educate and 
re-skill a large qualified workforce such as the one, for example, which is at the basis of 
Silicon Valley’s economic success. In particular, (Scott and Kirst 2017) highlight the crucial 
role played by broad access schools in enabling non-traditional students to enter post-
secondary education for the first time or re-enter after an interruption. Indeed, along with 
groundbreaking research and research-oriented human capital provided by elite research 
universities (e.g. Stanford University), the diversified population of broad access schools 
provides the basis for the qualified workforce needed to sustain the economic development 
of the area, at the same time providing re-skilling opportunities that respond to market needs 
and improve people’s employment chances. 
Building on this background, we will explore whether and how the introduction of this type 
of digital transformation in higher education challenges the existing distribution of power 
among actors in the organizational field and ultimately, whether this innovation further 
increases inequality among social groups. Indeed, If MOOCs drain an increasing number of 
students out of HE institutions, the number of non-permanent jobs and of new permanent 
ones potentially decreases in relation to lower numbers of students. Consequently, within 
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the faculty, those employed with non-tenured (teaching) posts may be the most harmed by 
the spread of MOOCs because the availability of teaching posts depends on the number of 
students. This negative dynamic may be even worse in low-status HE institutions, which are 
those more affected by the threat of MOOCs.  
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
The analysis reported in the paper combined bibliographic material with qualitative empirical 
material collected in Fall 2017-Spring 2018 on three cases of manifest opposition to the 
integration of MOOCs into regular academic curricula that happened at three different HE 
institutions in the USA: a large public university; a large private research university; a small 
liberal arts college. 
The construction of the case study started from a selection of articles in specialized 
magazines (e.g. Inside Higher Ed, The Chronicle of Higher Education) and major 
newspapers, like the New York Times, reporting about cases of protest or opposition against 
the adoption of MOOCs in the US higher education system. Further investigation of the 
cases also included articles from online university newspapers and publicly available 
documents from the selected universities’ websites. 
This preliminary material was supplemented by qualitative empirical material collected in 6 
interviews with experts1 conducted between November and December 2017 either face to 
face or at a distance through Skype and phone calls. Some of the experts were selected 
among faculties active in the protest movement because their names appeared in the 
newspaper articles selected for the case studies. These interviewees also recommended 
other potential interviewees (snowball sampling) who played a significant role in the process. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the characteristics of the interviewees, who were about evenly 
divided between males and females. 
 
Table 1 List of experts interviewed 
 Role Type of institution 
1 Tenured Professor 
public, non-elite, comprehensive college  
(4-year) 
2 Tenured Professor 
3 Tenured Professor 
4 Tenured Professor 
private, élite research university 
5 Tenured Professor 
6 Tenured Professor  
private, élite, liberal arts college  
(baccalaureate college) 
                                                          
1 The total number of people interviewed were 11, of which 6 are the interviews most relevant for this study.  
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Bibliographic sources such as academic books and scientific journal articles were used to 
integrate the case studies within the broader theoretical framework presented in section 2. 
The information gathered through bibliographic resources was used to identify key actors, 
their roles, supporters’ and opponents’ arguments, and the dynamics at work in each case 
study.  
Qualitative interviews followed a semi-structured outline consisting of a common core of 
themes and a set of customized themes according to the institutional role of the interviewee. 
The interviewees were contacted via email, and the interview was conducted in person, by 
phone or Skype. All interviews were recorded and transcribed for research purposes. The 
analysis of qualitative material first aimed at clarifying and confirming the relationships 
among actors and their roles, as identified in bibliographic sources. The analysis then 
focused on investigating specific topics defined a priori: motivations, tensions among faculty 
members, tensions among disciplines, modes of mobilization, outcomes. Transcriptions 
were read and coded according to a priori defined themes and new ones, where available. 
As a final step, interviewees gave feedback on the representation of their own case in a 
preliminary draft of the paper, following a backtalk process (Cardano 2003). 
 
THE THREE CASE STUDIES 
 
In Spring 2013 a movement of opposition mounted at several universities against the 
adoption of MOOCs for credits in regular courses received a great deal of attention in the 
media. The opposition was particularly organized and successful at three institutions that 
differed widely as regards their origin, composition of the student body, prestige and mission 
but, nonetheless, reached a common outcome.  
The various mobilizations took place almost at the same time, between April-May 2013. This 
was the tail of the MOOC-mania that spread across the country in 2012, and started to re-
direct its focus on the potential of MOOCs within traditional face-to-face education. As 
recognized also by faculty, in that specific period “the online for-credit conversation is 
happening across academia” involving all HE institutions in the United States. Nonetheless, 
there was no coordination among the actors of the protest. Most HE institutions were under 
pressure from their administrations more or less at the same time, and this made the time 
ripe for reaction at some institutions. But the mobilization always remained local and never 
formalized in a broader movement. 
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In this section we present in detail the context in which the protest movement took place at 
each of the three institutions considered. Then we provide an overview of the main features 
and mechanisms that characterize the overall pattern of the resistance process.  
 
Large public university 
 
The first case is a public four-year comprehensive college enrolling about 30,000 students, 
belonging to the state university system. It is a non-selective institution, mainly focused on 
teaching, which hosts a population of students very diverse in terms of ethnic and 
socioeconomic background (only 17% of students are of white ethnic background and over 
half of incoming freshman and transfer students are first-generation college students). It is 
located at the heart of the South-Bay region, which hosts some of Silicon Valley’s most 
influential businesses as well as the main law firms and venture capital firms supporting the 
economic success of Silicon Valley (Scott, Holzman, et al. 2017). Its location has contributed 
to making the university a key provider of qualified labor but at the same time a designated 
candidate for the experiments of some of the Silicon Valley start-ups. Indeed, the successful 
development of the software and technology sector in the area contributed to the university’s 
expansion in the 1970s, in particular of the School of Engineering. Today the university is a 
major provider of qualified labor employed in the economy of the Valley as engineers and 
software programmers but also as mid-level workers in the field of marketing and 
management (Scott and Kirst 2017). At the same time, the university's proximity to Silicon 
Valley educational start-ups, its public nature and its non-selective status made it a 
candidate for testing the potential of MOOCs as a low-cost alternative way to reduce the 
cost of education. Experiments in this field were indeed backed by the positive attitude of 
the state governor (who encouraged an aggressive move of state universities to online 
education (Lewin and Markoff 2013; Young and Nesson 2014; Asimov 2018)) and by the 
university’s president (Qayoumi and Polese 2012). 
A couple of pilot projects were introduced in order to test the feasibility of integrating MOOCs 
for credits into the traditional curriculum of the university. The first one took place in Fall 
2012 in the form of a blended course and yielded positive results: in partnership with edX, a 
course on ‘Circuits and Electronics’ was blended with lectures from the corresponding edX 
MOOC and class discussion with university instructors (Scott, Biag, et al. 2017). A second 
experiment, which received a higher degree of media coverage but achieved less positive 
outcomes, started in January 2013, when the university partnered with Udacity to deliver a 
series of remedial and introductory courses to its students and to students at a charter high 
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school. The courses were no longer MOOCs in the strict sense, since there were capped 
enrollments, courses were not free2, students could earn credits and could interact online 
with the instructor. But the course was provided using the Udacity platform, and the same 
course was also offered as a MOOC on the platform. However, despite great expectations 
(Lewin and Markoff 2013) pass rates were very poor compared with face to face courses,3 
which resulted in a negative media response and the pilot program being put on hold 
(Woodhead et al. 2017; Lewin 2013c). A few months later, in March 2013, faculty at the 
Philosophy Department were asked to “pilot” the edX MOOC on ‘Justice’ featuring the star 
professor Michael Sandel from Harvard University in their regular philosophy lectures. This 
event ignited the mobilization process. Although university leaders assured in later news 
releases that there was no imposition of any sort, faculty at the philosophy department 
declared continuous pressure from the administration and a climate of retaliation for 
noncompliance and refusal (The SJSU Philosophy Department 2017). Nonetheless, the 
determination of the university’s administration did not decrease, as it soon addressed the 
same request to the English Department. At this point, faculty at the Philosophy Department 
felt that the issue was not only a threat to the department but also involved the entire system 
of state universities and decided to react collectively by addressing a wider audience. The 
open letter was addressed to Michael Sandel and was made public through several 
newspapers and magazines, receiving good media coverage in April-May 2013 in national 
and international newspapers (Kolowich 2013; Lewin 2013b; The SJSU Philosophy 
Department 2017).  
The letter raised three main concerns, regarding:  
i) the lower pedagogical quality of the education provided in MOOCs;  
ii) issues of social injustice toward students passively exposed to a lower quality product 
with no opportunity of interaction; toward faculty, who are downgraded to mere teaching 
assistants; toward the discipline, with the enforcement of one single hegemonic intellectual 
view on the topic, the one by the star professor and, finally,  
iii) concerns about the shift in paradigm of public education from being a common good to a 
private enterprise.  
                                                          
2 The fee for these courses was about $150, much lower than the average cost of $450-$500. 
3 According to Woodhead et al. (2017) the pass rate was 50% and 67% in Elementary Statistics and General 
Psychology versus a typical pass rate of 76% and 83% in face to face courses. According to Lewin (2013) only 
25% of students on the Algebra course passed the exam and the percentage dropped to 12% among high 
school students. After these results, S. Thrun declared that Udacity was providing a “lousy product” (Chafkin 
2013). 
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The latter is a key point of the mobilization: the letter directly addressed the threat that public 
education could fall into the hands of private commercial vendors, with all the associated 
consequences in terms of equality, freedom and transparency.  
The concerns raised in the letter were shared by all faculty at the institution and the letter 
was endorsed by the California Faculty Association giving a broader audience and visibility 
to the mobilization.  
The mobilization also produced a Sense of the Senate Resolution, dated November 2013, 
requesting the university chancellor to conduct a review of the university’s governance 
(Academic Senate 2013). The main concerns were about the lack of transparency and 
communication with all the components of the university, resulting in low morale and 
compromising the sense of community at the institution. The President remained in office 
until August 2014, when he resigned to serve as a consultant for a foreign government. 
 
Large private research university 
 
The second case is a private, élite university. It is a general research university, with both 
undergraduate and graduate programs. In 2018 the university enrolled about 15,000 
students, of which 45% were of Caucasian ethnic background, 10% were first-generation 
college students, and about 50% received some form of financial aid.4 The university keeps 
its inheritance of elite liberal art college with a very low student-professor ratio (6:1) and two 
thirds of classes held in small groups (less than 20 students), but it has expanded into a 
comprehensive research university organized into 12 schools covering diverse fields of 
study: engineering, medicine, divinity, arts and sciences.  
It was the latter, the College of Arts and Sciences, that became the main player in the MOOC 
case. In November 2012 the University Provost signed a commercial contract with a private 
company in the sector of educational technology to join the company’s project called 
‘Semester Online’. The latter was a consortium created to launch a 3-year pilot program 
offering MOOCs for academic credits from prestigious universities in the USA (the 
consortium comprised 10 schools). According to the agreement, the university would offer 
its own MOOCs (in this case no longer free and developed in partnership with the company’s 
designers) on the Semester Online platform, but each department had an opt-in/opt-out 
clause by which it could decide whether or not to participate. Students enrolled at any of the 
universities belonging to the consortium could claim academic credits for a maximum of 1 
                                                          
4 University website. 
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course per semester and 4 courses in the entire undergraduate program. The case exploded 
in April 2013 because the contract, foreseeing the introduction of credit recognition through 
online courses provided on Semester Online, needed to be ratified by the Arts and Sciences 
Council (the largest faculty governing board of the university), responsible for undergraduate 
curricula and any teaching-related issues (Baccellieri 2013).  
The debate took place on April 25, and the Council meeting was very attended. Professors 
had two microphones in the room, one for speakers in support of the proposal and one for 
those against it; all those who wanted to participate lined up behind the microphone and 
spoke alternately. At the end of the debate the dean of the faculty of Arts & Sciences, in 
favor of the agreement, summarized her standpoint, and after that the voting process took 
place with a secret ballot. As a result of the vote the Council rejected the contract with the 
private company by 16 votes against, 14 in favor and 2 abstaining, which also meant the 
withdrawal of the university from the consortium and the end of the partnership with the 
company (Lewin 2013a; Mock 2013; Baccellieri 2013; Arts & Sciences Council 2013).  
The main concerns addressed by faculty in the discussion dealt with two key issues: one 
was procedural, about the lack of faculty consultation and transparency on the matter; the 
other dealt with the strategic opportuneness for a prestigious university committed to 
delivering high quality education as a non-profit - although private - institution to partner with 
a for-profit private company. Other positions questioned the prestige of other institutions in 
the consortium, which could have harmed the reputation of the university.  
The negative reaction of the Council had a significant echo in the media. After the vote, two 
other partners of Semester Online program withdrew from the consortium and the whole 
program was definitively discontinued in Summer 2014. 
The discussion about online courses for credits continued with other motions and other 
proposals on how to integrate internet courses for credits in the following months, but none 
of them eventually took place, and MOOCs provided by the university on the Coursera or 
edX platforms are not part of a structured plan of the university and do not grant academic 
credits. 
 
Small Liberal Arts College 
 
The third institution is an elite, private liberal arts college. It was founded in 1821 and is the 
third oldest HE institution in the state. It is a highly selective college, and has an outstanding 
reputation among the best liberal arts colleges according to the Wall Street Journal and U.S. 
News & World Report. Its focus is on undergraduate education only: in 2018 it counted about 
17 
 
1,850 students, enrolled in about 40 majors spanning across arts, humanities, natural 
sciences and social sciences. Because of its nature as a selective and prestigious liberal 
arts college, the student-to-faculty ratio is quite low (8:1). The average size of classes is 19 
students and more than 80% of the classes have less than 30 students. Notwithstanding its 
selective nature, the college has a quite diverse student body, with 45% of students who 
self-define themselves as persons of color, 55% of students who receive financial aid and 
11% first-generation college students.5 
The case against MOOCs for credits took place in April 2013 when a proposal from edX to 
integrate their technology into the regular curriculum of undergraduate courses was 
submitted to the vote of the whole Faculty. The meeting that took place on 16 April 2013 
foresaw the evaluation of three competing alternatives for online education and mirrored two 
different approaches (Rothman 2013; Chen 2013; Rivard 2013; Hashmi and Shih 2013) . A 
first motion, presented by a professor of political sciences, was about the approval of a 
partnership with edX which would have taken the form of a 5 year-pilot project. This pilot 
project foresaw two options: a) an entirely edX-supported MOOC model; b) a beta MOOC 
model. With the first former, the college would work in close partnership with edX, providing 
the technology and the design support for creating for courses in three years at the cost of 
about 2 million dollars. Learners participating in these courses would gain a certificate of 
completion from the college, not necessarily college credits. The latter option, the self-
supported edX beta-model, would allow professors to use edX technology to provide their 
own courses. They would receive minimal assistance from edX on course creation, but this 
option did not imply paying edX for initial beta-courses and did not involve issuing certificates 
(but only for the first release of the course). 
The alternative motion, proposed by a professor of neurosciences on behalf of a group of 
colleagues, foresaw that the college itself would be responsible for offering its own online 
courses, also starting with moving online classes and course materials already available. 
Professors would thus be free to decide whether and to what extent to experiment with their 
own way of integrating educational technology, in the spirit of freely accessible courses 
without any certification. On the other hand, professors would have to rely on the college 
infrastructure for the practical implementation of the initiative. 
The first proposal, advocating a partnership with edX, received a negative response with 70 
votes against it, and 36 votes in favor. Instead, the second motion, concerning the college’s 
                                                          
5 College website 
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own initiative in incorporating education technology and pursuing online education by putting 
course materials online, was approved with 70 in favor, 41 against and 5 abstentions.  
The concerns raised by opponents of the partnership with edX involved macro-level 
considerations about the quality of education furnished by MOOCs and platforms like edX, 
and the consequences of this phenomenon on HE institutions. Concern was expressed on 
the risk of progressively replacing high-quality classroom experience with standardized 
courses delivered by superstar professors (some of the faculty explicitly referred to the case 
of Michael Sandel’s course in Justice) to the detriment of the rest of the professoriate as a 
whole. This position was driven by concerns about solidarity across the profession, pointing 
to the risk of job losses for academics at different institutions, in particular in less prestigious 
institutions In this same line, opponents found disturbing the corporate approach of edX 
which, although being registered as non-profit company tends to adopt the market strategies 
of for-profit competitors (Shah 2018), together with a certain attitude of edX in branding 
themselves using the reputation of the partner universities. 
At micro level, opponents questioned the convenience of joining such an expensive 
partnership for a prestigious institution like theirs. The College would have to bear the entire 
costs of the partnership, with the risk of undermining its reputation based on a high-quality 
model of education involving interactive teaching and mentoring in small groups. The idea 
itself of reaching thousands of learners worldwide was said not to fit the college’s mission of 
being a small residential community, while the partner edX would have a product available 
for potentially infinite subsequent releases. Another key point in this regard was the issuing 
of certificates for the courses, which could harm the College’s interests in the long run in 
terms of both revenues and brand inflation. 
Eventually, the partnership with edX was never approved. MOOCs were eliminated from the 
dean’s agenda and were not proposed again in the following years. In the end, MOOCs for 
credits never entered the curriculum of the college. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Overall, the three cases confirm tension between faculty and academic leadership in charge 
of the governance of HE institutions at both local and national level; a tension between the 
neoliberal approach of MOOCs advocates and demands for autonomy advanced by the 
academic staff. As regards the professoriate, the three cases do not exhibit profound internal 
divides. Despite the persistence of different ideologies, statuses and aspirations among 
faculty members, the mobilization does not evince severe conflicts either among disciplines 
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or among academic positions. Finally, although we are not able to establish any causal link, 
we argue that, among other factors, the success of resistance movements contributed to the 
disenchantment toward MOOCs, to question their business models and to downsize their 
range of action.  
 
Tension between faculty members and academic leadership 
 
The mobilization mounted against MOOCs at the three universities analyzed, witnessed the 
contraposition between the academic component, faculty, and the top-level administrators, 
i.e. presidents, provosts and deans. Although there were supporters among faculties, the 
initiative of MOOCs for credits always came from the academic leadership of the institution.  
These initiatives were proposed through a top-down approach in which administrators 
advocated the introduction of MOOCs for credits, applying pressure on the faculty to adopt 
their plan. In two of the three cases considered, this top-down approach was exacerbated 
by the fact that the administrators had already signed a covert agreement with MOOC 
providers or educational technology companies to provide the service. Consequently, the 
faculty received the plans when everything had already been defined, even signed, and the 
faculty’s only option was to ratify the contract. Indeed, faculty were consulted as a final step 
because the governance system of the universities required the approval of the faculty 
governing body for any reform or change involving the undergraduate curriculum. In another 
case, the plan was approved by the representative body but, according to the sources, the 
meeting took place in a period when most of the faculty were off-campus. Hence the faculty 
as a whole was informed about the plans at short notice and was confronted with an already-
defined agreement presented by the administrators as the best deal, and on which the 
faculty representative body could only cast a positive or negative vote. The sources reported 
complaints about the lack of consultation and transparency with the different categories of 
the university and their representative bodies.  
In one case the process was more inclusive, also due to the small size of the institution. 
Here the dean and a restricted committee (consisting of three elected representatives of 
faculty) drafted a plan, which went through the faculty’s executive committee (The 
Committee of Six) and was then submitted to the vote of the faculty. Also in this case, some 
sources complained about continuously changing versions of the plan and the arrival of the 
proposals at the last minute, on the same day as the vote. 
Another typical feature was the pressure and sense of urgency that surrounded the whole 
situation: advocates of the plans stressed the need to be the first; to chase the rhythm of 
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technological innovation and to surf the hype, including a certain inevitability of the diffusion 
of technology. An edu-specific version of M. Zuckerberg’s recommendation “Move fast and 
break things” emerges from the following quote: 
 
“‘If this is disruptive it must be good’. So I think that was the main driver. So it was 
partly ideological, but the ideology was less political…” [professor, large public 
university] 
 
All these elements generated a widespread climate of mistrust in the top leadership, in 
particular at the largest universities, which widened the gap between the academic and 
administrative components of the university. This tension emerged clearly from several 
interviews: 
 
“there was mistrust of the administration’s plan that was done… and the urging of the 
negotiation to [name of the company] (…). Nobody had heard about it until the proposal had 
pretty much been signed.” [professor, large private university] 
 
    “in the procedure, if you want to do something like this, you have to go to the 
Academic Senate and it has to be approved. But he [the President] knew that it would never 
happen, so he did it during winter session, when nobody was here (…). So, when faculty 
came back to the Senate they were furious…” [professor, large public university] 
 
The faculty expressed concern about the connections of the top leadership with private 
commercial companies in the educational sector. It did so for a number of practical and 
ideological reasons. It was contested the conflict between the for-profit nature of the partners 
or the agreements (even if coming from non-profit subjects) and the view of education as a 
public good or at least as a non-profit domain expressed by the faculty at all institutions, 
including the private ones. From a general ideological opposition to such an elitist and 
exclusive approach to education, in a couple of cases the faculty raised serious concerns 
about presumed intents of privatizing education to the benefit of the few and to the detriment 
of the public good. The ‘few’ would not have been some selected students but education 
technology companies first, at least for-profit ones, and then administrators, who may have 
had some forms of private returns from the agreements. This is a serious allegation that 
emerges from the interviews and documents analyzed, in which faculty at large institutions 
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who opposed the plans were very outspoken against the dominant ideology of edu-tech 
companies and the risk of private returns to the detriment of the public good. This point is 
particularly important if we consider that two of the three institutions considered are private 
universities, though both of them have a non-profit nature and have public goals among their 
priorities. 
The opposition to the ideology that characterized the MOOC hype and in general the ‘secular 
evangelism’ or the tech-universalism personified by Silicon Valley companies is very 
straightforward. It is based on two main points. The first argument is against the belief that 
technological innovation can rapidly and efficiently resolve longstanding social issues such 
as inequalities in education. The second is that education can be considered an industry like 
all the others in which market logics apply. In this framework education technology 
companies see themselves as able to contribute to the advancement of society while at the 
same time earning (high) revenues. The idea that edu-tech companies involved in these 
plans are gaining profit from higher education institutions, which are non-profit even in the 
case of the private institutions considered, is one of the major concerns.  
The permeability of HE institutions to managerial logics, and in particular to competition, is 
not a new topic. Already in the late 1990s (Slaughter and Leslie 1999) spoke about the 
entrepreneurial university and the emergence of academic capitalism. (Gumport 2000) 
warned about the reshaping of institutional purposes of HE institutions under utilitarian 
principles and its consequences in terms of the emergence of competing institutional logics 
that conceive universities as a social institution vs. universities as an industry. Recently, 
(Musselin 2018) has redirected scholarly attention to the issue of competition by arguing 
that competition has become an institutional trait, especially for research universities, 
influencing their strategies and their internal governance, with the consequence – among 
others - of replacing collegial relationships with managerial practices. The three cases 
proposed in this paper show that such a tension emerged quite manifestly.  
Particularly at the largest institutions, faculty contested the risk of convergence of private 
interests between administrators and private companies to the detriment of education as a 
public good. Potentially, edu-tech companies have a commercial interest in entering the 
market of public education; on the other side, administrators may see this as a political 
opportunity of visibility in several respects. For example, top administrators at public 
universities may have an interest in presenting the initiative to state-level administrators as 
a commitment to reducing the cost of education, improving education efficiency, and - last 
but not least - showing their determination to keep pace with innovation in the field. Similarly, 
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high-ranking administrators at private universities may be interested in demonstrating their 
engagement in the technological frontier, but also in showing to their stakeholders that they 
are committed to increasing revenues and reducing costs. At middle rank, Deans and faculty 
may have a return in visibility, for future prospects of career (e.g. toward Provosts).  
Some interviewees mentioned these concerns about the transformation of the public good 
to the advantage of private actors: 
 
“the worry that the faculty had on this campus was that the focus was not on 
education, the focus was on trying to make money and make education something that didn’t 
need government support, either state or federal. So this was the world we were living in: 
we were suspicious of everything and for good reason” [professor, large public university] 
 
“What we didn’t think it was fine was sort of taking those… tools, those educational 
tools, and turning them into an opportunity for somebody else to make a buck…some private 
organizations to make a buck, and to save money here whether or not it was good for our 
students” [professor, large public university] 
 
Some others highlighted the emphasis given by commercial partners to economic returns 
on these agreements:  
 
“But it is always also about [name of the university] making more money!” [professor, 
private research university]  
 
“why should it be so exclusive? They just want to use [college] name, because 
[college name] is quite famous in America, maybe not around the world, but well-known in 
America, as a good four-year college.” [professor, small liberal arts college]  
 
In some cases, even private returns were hypothesized, involving future steps of the career 
outside academia: 
 
 “they seemed to be spending a lot of time hanging out with big companies in the 
[Silicon] Valley and they seemed to be doing things that were more beneficial there. So one 
can only guess that people were also looking towards …you know… their next job paying a 
lot more than the job here, and anyway...” [professor, large public university] 
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The arguments of the opponents also involved the quality itself of the education provided 
through MOOCs and issues of social justice. Indeed, the quality of the type of education 
provided by MOOCs was accused of being inferior to that delivered face to face on campus, 
also in light of empirical research becoming available at that time. Moreover, faculty claimed 
that standardized courses like MOOCs disregard the diversity of the audience they reach 
and provide only one standpoint within a certain discipline. For example, faculty at the public 
university affirmed their commitment to delivering course content which took the diverse 
ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds of campus students into consideration and was 
customized to their specific needs. Similarly, at the private research university, where 
students are less diverse, issues of equality raised but from another perspective: students 
acquiring academic credits on Semester Online would have accessed lower quality content 
despite paying full tuition costs like students taking the course on campus. These concerns 
were expressed by faculty at both public universities:  
 
“Professor Sandel and his students represent a certain strata of society. (…) Many of 
them will not know what it is like to face the issues of justice that are faced by typical students 
at colleges that serve students from other social contexts. Views of justice that question the 
establishment will not be heard or will not be heard with any vigor. Moreover, students in the 
flipped classrooms will see privileged college students interacting with the “real” teacher, 
Professor Sandel, whereas they only get to interact with other students and their “lesser” 
teacher at [university’s name], a teacher whose own views on justice are now seen as having 
no importance because he or she is no longer a “content provider”” (Philosophy Department 
2017, 263) 
 
and private (although non-profit) institutions:  
 
“what pedagogically does it mean, and also financially, to charge students and their 
parents and their loans….and the federal government for financial aid…to charge that kind 
of money but not give them the quality that they need?” [professor, private research 
university] 
 
Besides the above-mentioned ideological issues opponents expressed concerns about 
more tangible issues as well. On one side, the perspective of adoption of MOOCs for credit 
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threatened the corporative interest of the faculty inasmuch it represents a threat to the 
number of academic posts in the future and to the maintenance of academic status. Indeed, 
at all of the three universities considered, faculty cited the risk of losing current and future 
academic posts, or even entire departments in the worst scenario, because they would no 
longer be needed, being substituted by video lectures. This concern was not limited to the 
interviewees own inner group, but also extended to faculty at other lower-tier institutions:   
 
“Then you face the question: “…well, if universities X and Y and Z are teaching a 
mythology course, why does [university’s name] need to teach a mythology course? And 
eventually, why do we need professor X teaching the course?”. And if you follow that line, 
then eventually you can see positions and departments being eliminated because we can 
just rely on videos from University X or University Y.” [professor, private research university]  
 
““So the faculty members at College said: well, we are very lucky that we do not have 
to worry much about it, but what about our colleagues? We all know people who are 
professors at some state colleges, something like that (…). So we said: why are they going 
to be destroyed by this? That didn’t seem right either.” [professor, liberal arts college]  
 
Moreover, one major concern of faculty, particularly at the state universities, was that their 
role would be downgraded to the status of teaching assistants to star professors. This would 
primarily be a loss of autonomy and status that increased the already-existing segmentation 
of the US higher education system. This would further exacerbate the divide between 
(shrinking) prestigious and protected academic careers and the growing number of 
temporary and precarious jobs in academia. Some quotes are particularly illustrative of the 
worry about the professoriate’s loss of prestige and autonomy: 
 
 “why should we get a Harvard professor to give a class in Greek philosophy? (…) 
But the idea is…it’s a real kind of…academic snobbishness. (…) Behind it all, there is the 
idea that…there is this sort of repository of knowledge, you know… and that they [Ivy League 
and the research universities] are it. They are the gatekeepers of the repository of 
knowledge….” [professor, public university] 
 
Others stressed the risk of further segmenting and devaluing academic labor: 
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“what it looked like, was…you essentially do these lectures, you do not own them 
anymore, and many low level PhDs and other academics would become …they would be 
doing most of the labor but that labor would not be remunerated. It’s like everybody will 
become a TA.” [professor, private research university] 
 
At private institutions some faculty were also worried about the exploitation of the brand by 
for-profit companies. Indeed, in the highly stratified system of HE in the USA, reputation is 
an important asset of HE institutions, and elite universities are well aware of the potential of 
their own brand. An example in this regard was provided by a professor at a private 
institution:   
 
“We are clearly good for [company name], but I am not really sure that [company 
name] is good for us” [private research university, reported in minutes of faculty meeting] 
 
“And there were also concern about …it seemed that the other universities in the 
consortium were not quite in the same league as [name of the institution]. And then [name 
of the institution] was acting as the principal attractive source in terms of stature or standard.” 
[professor, private research university] 
 
“What’s the point of the brand if it is available to everyone? So, some actually made 
the argument of ‘you reduce the value of the elite degree’.” [professor, private research 
university] 
 
In a couple of cases this mistrust was heightened by prior experiences in which the 
university’s top leadership showed unclear connections with the business sector. An 
interviewee recalled prior audit measures in this respect:  
 
“We were audited by the State University system and they found two things that had 
happened on our campus that were problematic: One was teaching regular session classes 
through inter-session and secondly, charging more than students were supposed to pay for 
these things.” [professor, public university] 
 
Faculty and mobilization 
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The mobilization that took place at the three institutions considered was characterized by an 
unexpected cohesion among all academic positions, both tenured and untenured. Indeed, 
we expected that the main component of the mobilization, as well as the origin of the protest, 
would be untenured professors (e.g. adjunct, assistant professors and other teaching 
positions) which would be the first to be directly affected by a substitution of face-to-face 
courses with MOOCs or other online sources. In fact, the sources analyzed furnish a 
different frame in which the engine of the mobilization were full professors, who were 
outspoken also on behalf of untenured colleagues who did not have the same freedom to 
act individually. Indeed, openly displeasing the key advocates of these initiatives, who as 
we have seen were generally top leaders, would have been very risky for untenured 
positions, which are sensitive to the evaluation of deans and other academic leaders for 
their renewal. There thus emerges a context of solidarity among faculty, who acted as a 
cohesive and homogeneous group. The explicit reason was to protect all the members of 
the group from retaliation by the top leadership, i.e. the Dean, the Provost or President. The 
risk of retaliation or punishment was a concern very apparent from the outset, also for 
tenured faculty, and the actors implemented various strategies to avoid it. For example, key 
documents concerning the protest were signed collectively. In all three cases, the main 
actors in the protest, the ones who initiated the process and became visible in the media 
were full or, in a few cases, associate professors. They explicitly stated that they had taken 
into consideration the instances of colleagues at lower levels of the hierarchy and spoken to 
protect them. This strategy emerges clearly from interviews at both public and private 
institutions: 
 
“Nobody said no, and we decided to sign the letter ‘The Department of Philosophy’. 
And we decided to do that because everybody signed it, nobody said no, and we certainly 
shared it very widely with everybody in the department including our graduate students who 
are also teaching classes for us. So everybody shared it and we decided…you know, partly 
we thought about protecting people from retaliation…. I said “I would be happy to sign it 
myself”, you know, we thought it would protect people. What are they going to do to me, I 
am a full professor…” [professor, public university] 
 
“we also tried to make it … you know, distributed. So that the punishment would not go 
on…do you see what I mean? Like…we didn’t have leaders at that time. It was clear there 
were leaders, but there is definitely retribution. And so you don’t…it was a weird thing, to try 
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to be effective but also to deal with …to deal with…you don’t want be delegitimized or 
attacked …so this is the big reason why we included so many. But I think that the statement 
which went out loudly was very empowering for a lot… you know…for faculty at a number 
of schools listed in this contract, they were ‘Ok, this happens at [name of university]’. I mean, 
it is not the same as at state schools.” [professor, private research university] 
 
“(…) it is always true that in the Faculty meetings, the tenured professors tend to be the 
ones that speak out most because they don’t have to worry, while the untenured professors 
are more hesitant. So not very many of the untenured professors participated in the debate, 
but they did vote, the vote was secret, so they could vote. Anyways they won, and definitely 
the vote was strong enough that many junior professors had to be voting against joining 
edX.” [professor, liberal arts college] 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we have analyzed one of the few successful movements of resistance mounted 
against the introduction of the digital transformation and its consequences in terms of 
reorganization of labor. It happened in the higher education system, a particular sector 
characterized by unique features compared to other markets where digital innovation has 
radically transformed labor relationships, organizational settings, and the demand (e.g. 
transportation and hospitality sector). 
The three case studies presented in the paper were intended to illustrate whether and to 
what extent the introduction of a digital transformation like MOOCs, changing the way 
education is produced, delivered and consumed, may have had an impact on the existing 
institutions, both micro and macro level. At macro level we investigated whether such digital 
transformation generated tensions in a HE system already highly stratified among 
institutions of different reputation and mission. On the micro level, the paper has analyzed 
whether the introduction of MOOCs challenged the existing model of governance and 
distribution of power among actors within each institution and, ultimately, whether this would 
have increased inequality among some particular social groups (e.g. tenured vs. untenured 
professors or across disciplines). 
Overall, the three case studies analyzed share a number of features, summarized in Fig.4:  
a) a contraposition between top leadership of the university (Presidents, Provosts and 
Deans) and the academic component of the university, the faculty. In all three cases the 
process was characterized by a top-down approach in which administrators advocated the 
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introduction of MOOCs for credits, putting pressure (although to various extents) on the 
faculty to adopt their plan. The faculty, in turn, opposed the administrators’ proposals on the 
basis of several lines of argument. The main concerns centered on the entry of commercial 
actors and the search for profit in a field, education, traditionally considered to be a public 
good; concerns also dealt with the consequences in terms of reduction or devaluation of 
faculty positions and lack of transparency regarding the making of the contracts. However, 
none of the interviewees ever mentioned opposition to the use of technology in education 
and to opening access to educational resources as such. Faculty rejected accusations of 
being ‘luddites’: their concerns went beyond corporate self-interest, and the solidarity 
characterizing the mobilization traversed internal hierarchies and different types of 
institutions. 
An important feature of the administrators’ plans is that, in two out of the three cases, a 
MOOC provider or educational technology company had already signed a covert agreement 
with the university, which needed to be approved or ratified by the governing body of the 
academic component of the university, which is responsible for the definition of 
undergraduate curriculum. This contributed to the spread of a climate of mistrust. The top-
down approach was accompanied by complaints about lack of consultation and 
transparency with the different categories of the university and their representative bodies, 
together with a sense of urgency that surrounded the vote. This perception was further 
reinforced by prior experiences that involved top administrators regarding unclear 
connections with the business sector. 
b) In all three cases, MOOCs would have lost their constitutive characteristics of 
openness and ‘massiveness’, and would have been recognized for academic credits. The 
key point in all three cases was granting academic credits to these online courses, which 
would have been offered at a lower cost compared to that of face-to-face courses. Faculty 
opposing the MOOCs for credits never opposed the existence of MOOCs as such, or other 
online courses as complementary resources. It was the substitutive nature of these courses 
(with respect to traditional education) that was to be opposed as constituting a threat. The 
fact that academic credits from an accredited HE institution could now be gained by students 
through online courses, with the same status as the other regular academic credits (based 
on a formal process of face-to-face instruction, assessment and evaluation of 
competencies), was the key point of the opposition by faculty at the public and private 
universities considered.  
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This implied the risk of losing both jobs and also status. In this regard, faculty acted as a 
homogenous group in terms of both positions and disciplines. Tenured professors were 
aware of the weaknesses of untenured colleagues and were purposefully outspoken on their 
behalf. Moreover, there was no clear divide among disciplines in terms of support to MOOCs 
for credit, and the affiliation of opponents in terms of field of study was quite heterogeneous, 
without a clear divide between humanities and hard sciences. 
c) The resistance was successful in several respects. First, the main outcome was 
that the plans proposed by the administrations were blocked and MOOCs for credit in the 
HE institutions considered never again entered the agenda. A secondary outcome concerns 
the career paths of those advocating MOOCs for credit: all of them moved away from their 
posts and only in one case was it an upward mobility. Indeed, the provost of the private 
research university left in August 2013; the president of the state university left the post in 
2014. By contrast, at the liberal arts college considered, one of the main advocates became 
dean, but there were no changes in the top leadership.  
Finally, we argue that the mobilization may have contributed at the macro level to the 
setback of MOOCs in the HE system and in the media, slowing down the spread of MOOCs, 
although the process may have been the result of multiple factors and we are not able to 
establish any causal link. The mobilization can be considered successful insofar as it 
produced the intended outcome locally, at the three universities. But its echo also 
contributed more widely, at least at national level if not internationally, to initiating a more 
critical discussion about MOOCs, the digital transformation in education and its social 
implications in general. Unlike experiences of digital transformation that occurred in other 
domains, like the transportation and hospitality industries (e.g. Uber, Airbnb), in the case of 
higher education the specific institutional and organizational configuration of the sector 
(including institutions and actors) contributed to a positive outcome of the processes of 
resistance. Indeed, the sector has important barriers of access by which university 
professors cannot be substituted – at least in the short term - by people external to the 
system, so that the implementation of the innovation itself cannot bypass university 
professors; rather, it needs their active collaboration. As also noted by Musselin (2018), the 
comparison with the sharing economy contributes to highlighting the ability of the higher 
education system to remain resilient in face of economic change. 
The work presented here is not exempt from limitations and for the moment it cannot go 
beyond being exploratory. Indeed, with the data at hand we are not able to determine any 
causal link between the mobilization and the fate of MOOCs; moreover, due to a lack of 
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comprehensive data, we cannot examine how many institutions that adopted MOOCs ended 
up by rejecting them. However, we can still reasonably argue that the impact of the 
mobilization on the media and on the public discourse may have contributed to a setback in 
the spread of MOOCs in the USA, and may have contributed to the descending part of the 
MOOC media-hype which, in 2014, started to deflate. Indeed, as acknowledged by one of 
the advocates of MOOCs at a public university, the mobilization and its press coverage 
seem to have had a profound impact:   
 
“We can only speculate about why the [University name] Plus program was 
terminated since [University name] Plus faculty were not debriefed about the decision. In 
our view there were likely three reasons why this program was abruptly discontinued: (a) 
low pass rates for students in the spring semester; (b) highly critical press regarding the 
results of the spring pilot program; and (c) pressure and media statements from [University 
name] faculty, including the California Faculty Association, the union to which the [University 
name] Plus faculty belonged.” (Woodhead et al. 2017, 465). 
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Figure 1 Number of newspaper headlines containing the word MOOC or MOOCs in the period 2012-2018 
 
Note: figures for 2018 are updated to August 1; figures for year 2011 are equal to zero.  
Source: own elaboration based on Factiva database selecting 5 major USA newspapers and 3 regional 
newspapers (The Wall Street Journal; The New York Times; Chicago Tribune; New York Post; Los Angeles 
Times; The Boston Globe; The Mercury News; San Francisco Chronicle). 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: The College Board 
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Figure 3 Growth of the Student Loan Market 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panle/Equifax 
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Figure 4 Interpretative framework – common pattern 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
 
